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Abstract—With a sponsored content scheme in a wireless
network, a sponsored content service provider can pay to a
network operator on behalf of the mobile users/subscribers to
lower down the network subscription fees at the reasonable
cost in terms of receiving some amount of advertisements. As
such, content providers, network operators and mobile users are
all actively motivated to participate in the sponsored content
ecosystem. Meanwhile, in 5G cellular networks, caching tech-
nique is employed to improve content service quality, which
stores potentially popular contents on edge networks nodes
to serve mobile users. In this work, we propose the joint
sponsored and edge caching content service market model. We
investigate an interplay between the sponsored content service
provider and the edge caching content service provider under
the non-cooperative game framework. Furthermore, a three-
stage Stackelberg game is formulated to model the interactions
among the network operator, content service provider, and mobile
users. Sub-game perfect equilibrium in each stage is analyzed by
backward induction. The existence of Stackelberg equilibrium is
validated by employing the bilevel optimization programming.
Based on the game properties, we propose a sub-gradient based
iterative algorithm, which ensures to converge to the Stackelberg
equilibrium.
Index Terms—Sponsored content, edge caching, content deliv-
ery network, Stackelberg game, bilevel optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Sponsored content in wireless networks has been introduced
as a promising scheme to utilize a proper designed incentive
mechanism to motivate mobile users to use more services
and consume more contents, generating higher revenue to the
mobile service ecosystem. For example, AT&T launched a
sponsored data plan that allows content service providers to
partly or fully pay for the data usages on behalf mobile users
to the network operator, when the mobile users access the
sponsored contents [1]. With the sponsored content scheme,
mobile users as the end users of network content services
can offload their data subscription fees to content service
providers. Correspondingly, content service providers can po-
tentially cooperate with network providers by sponsoring data
usages to motivate mobile users to join the network [2]–[4].
In the meanwhile, edge caching is emerging in the context
of 5G networks as a promising technique to deliver high
quality content services at lower costs. The key idea is that
the edge caching content service provider caches the content
on edge devices of the network in advance. Mobile users who
request for contents may access the contents directly at the
edge devices, without costly remote content deliveries. With
edge caching, mobile users may obtain content services via
local connections, e.g., WiFi, such that no cellular data usage
will be incurred. Therefore, edge caching can be viewed as an
alternative sponsorship scheme for mobile users. Edge caching
is seen as on of the most effective solutions to deal with
highly explosive content traffic demands in 5G era. As a result,
equipping caches at small base stations offers a promising
way to exploit the potential of edge networks in addition to
densifying the existing cellular networks.
In this work, we introduce the integration of the edge
caching and sponsored content schemes. In particular, we
investigate their interaction and their coexistence that affect the
mobile user behavior, the network operator in the data/content
traffic market. To sum up, the main contributions of this paper
are summarized as follows:
1) We formulate a joint sponsored and edge caching content
service market model to analyze the interactions among
the wireless network operator, the sponsored content
service provider as well as the edge caching content
service provider, and mobile users.
2) We formulate a novel three-stage Stackelberg game to
model their interactions to jointly maximize the payoff of
the wireless network operator, the profit of each content
service providers, and the utilities of mobile users.
3) Through backward induction, we analyze the sub-game
perfect equilibrium in each stage analytically. Further-
more, the existence of the Stackelberg equilibrium is
validated by capitalizing on the bilevel optimization tech-
nique.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the system description and Section III formulates a
three-stage Stackelberg game to model the joint sponsored and
edge caching content service market. The equilibrium analysis
are shown in Section IV. Section V provides the performance
evaluation. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a market-oriented content delivery network
consisting of four types of entities: a Wireless Network Opera-
tor (WNO), a Sponsored Content Service Provider (SCSP), an
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Edge Caching Content Service Provider (ECCSP), and a pool
of Mobile Users (MUs). The MUs can access contents (e.g.,
video) from the SCSP and ECCSP. If an MU accesses contents
from the SCSP, the contents can be downloaded directly
through the network infrastructure provided by the WNO. In
this case, the SCSP can sponsor for the data transfer from the
WNO to the MU. In the mean time, the MU can also access
contents stored in an edge caching device belonged to the
ECCSP. The MU can download the contents from the device
locally without involving the WNO. With the coexistence of
both SCSP and ECCSP, the MU who requests for contents
may autonomously choose the content source to lower down
the content cost. The SCSP and ECCSP need to compete with
each other to attract content demands from the users.
Let y denote the content (volume) demanded by MUs,
and σef(y) denote the utility obtained from accessing and
consuming the content, where the factor σe > 0 represents the
utility coefficient of MUs, e.g., a particular valuation between
MUs and content. Similar to that in [5], we first define the
following function:
f(y) =
1
1− αy
1−α, (1)
where 0 < α < 1 is a given coefficient. In particular, the
function f(·) is non-decreasing and concave with decreas-
ing marginal satisfaction, indicating the decreasing marginal
preference of MUs to contents. In traditional wireless content
access, the WNO charges each MU a price p for a unit
volume of content downloaded. Thus, the general form of
utility function of the MU with y content demand is given
defined as v(y) = σef(y)− py.
With a sponsored content scheme, the payment from MUs to
the WNO can be partly sponsored by the SCSP, as introduced
in Section I. Denote θ ∈ [0, 1] as a sponsorship factor of
content sponsored by the SCSP, i.e., θ units of the content is
sponsored. Thus, the MU pays for the rest (1 − θ)y units
of content to the WNO, with the cost (1 − θ)py incurred
to the MU [2], [3]. Generally, the MUs are also affected
by another variable la which is the amount of advertisement
imposed by the SCSP and ECCSP per volume of content.
We assume that la is constant for all contents. For example,
Pandora Internet Radio plays advertisement at regular intervals
between songs. We assume a normalized la ∈ [0, 1] since
both the ECCSP and SCSP have the amount of advertisements
strictly less than that of the provided contents. For the ease of
derivation later, we introduce an auxiliary variable τ defined
as τ = 11+la , τ ∈
[
1
2 , 1
]
. Thus, the utility of the MU which
has the content demand y from the SCSP is expressed as
us(y) = τσef(y)− (1− θ)py.
An ECCSP is able to cache contents in the edge caching
devices for MUs to access via a local network connection. We
denote t ∈ [0, 1] as the caching effort of the ECCSP, which
indicates the sponsorship from the ECCSP to MUs. When an
MU access the cached content from the ECCSP, the advertise-
ment from the ECCSP is imposed to the MU which lowers
its utility. Nevertheless, accessing the cached content, the MU
does not need to pay the WNO [6]. Accordingly, the utility of
the MU which has demand z for the cached content from the
ECCSP is expressed as ue(z) = τσef(z)g(t)− cz, where c is
the network handover cost. The caching effort t indicates the
amount of resources (e.g., storage and bandwidth) allocated
for delivering the cached content to the MUs. The function
g(t) is defined as content delivery quality. In particular, g(t) is
a monotonically increasing function with diminishing returns
reflecting the positive influence of caching effort t on MUs’
experience. Similar to (1), we adopt the a common function
to capture the Quality of Service (QoS) experienced by MUs,
i.e.,
g(t) =
1
1− β t
1−β , (2)
where 0 < β < 1 is defined to be a coefficient.
III. GAME FORMULATION FOR JOINT SPONSORED AND
EDGE CACHING CONTENT SERVICE MODEL
In this section, we formulate a three-stage Stackelberg game
to model the interactions among the network participants
(i.e., WNO, SCSP, ECCSP, and MUs). In the following
Sections III-A, III-B and III-B2, we analyze the sub-game
problems of each stage in the game.
A. Stage III: Mobile Users (Followers)
In the network, each MU may either choose to access the
sponsored contents from the SCSP, or the cached contents
provided by the ECCSP. The MU determines a fraction of
the content demand to access from the SCSP denoted by
x ∈ [0, 1]. The fraction of cached content demand from the
ECCSP is thus 1− x.
Each rational MU balances the content access between the
SCSP and ECCSP to maximize its utility. The utility of the
MU can be expressed as follows:
u(x; θ, t, p) = τσef(x)−(1−θ)xp+τσef(1−x)g(t)−(1−x)c,
(3)
where f(x) and g(t) are defined in (1) and (2), respectively.
Each MU sub-game problem can be formulated as follows,
given the volume unit price asked by the WNO, the sponsor-
ship factor θ from the SCSP and the caching effort t from the
ECCSP, the MU chooses x to maximize the utility:
Problem 1. (The MU sub-game):
maximize
x
u(x; θ, t, p)
subject to x ∈ [0, 1].
(4)
B. Stage II: SCSP and ECCSP (2nd-Tier Players)
At this stage, the SCSP and ECCSP both determine their
individual strategy simultaneously in a competitive manner,
given the pricing strategy of the WNO.
1) Sponsored Content Service Provider: The SCSP aims to
maximize the profit sponsoring, i.e., the gained advertisement
revenue minus the cost of sponsorship provided for the MUs,
as follows:
Πs(θ; p) = σch(x)− θpx. (5)
where σc is the advertisement revenue coefficient, and the term
σch(x) denotes the advertisement revenue [5], in which h(x)
is defined as follows:
h(x) =
1
1− γ x
1−γ , (6)
where 0 < γ < 1 which is a coefficient. Thus, the SCSP sub-
game is defined as follows:
Problem 2-A. (The SCSP sub-game):
maximize
x
Πs(θ; p)
subject to θ ∈ [0, 1].
(7)
2) Edge caching content service provider: As discussed in
Section II, the cost incurred to the ECCSP for caching the
content with caching effort t is denoted as Ct. The profit
gained by the ECCSP, i.e., the advertisement revenue from
content traffic minus the cost for content caching, is defined
as follows:
Πe(t; p) = σch(1− x)− Ct, (8)
where h(·) is the same as defined in (6). We assume C to be
a baseline content caching cost. The cost of the ECCSP for
caching the content with caching effort t is thus Ct [6]–[8].
Accordingly, the profit maximization problem of the ECCSP
is formulated as follows:
Problem 2-B. (The ECCSP sub-game):
maximize
x
Πe(t; p)
subject to t ∈ [0, 1].
(9)
C. Stage I: Wireless Network Operator (1st-Tier Player)
The WNO sets the volume unit price p for data traffic.
In addition to obtaining its revenue from charging the SCSP
and MUs, the WNO also has the content delivery cost.
Accordingly, the objective of the WNO is to maximize its
payoff, expressed as follows:
P(p) = px− wx2, (10)
where wx2 denotes the corresponding cost, and w represents
the unit cost of content delivery. The quadratic sum form re-
flects the marginal cost increases as the total demand increases,
e.g., due to congestion effects, which is a well-accepted
assumption. The strategy space of the WNO is denoted as
{P : 0 ≤ p ≤ p}, where p is the maximum price. As a result,
the payoff maximization problem of the WNO is formulated
as follows:
Problem 3. (The WNO sub-game):
maximize
x
P(p)
subject to p ∈ [0, p].
(11)
Problems 1, 2-A, 2-B and 3 altogether form a three-stage
Stackelberg game with the objective of finding the Stackelberg
equilibrium. In the next section, the sub-game problems will
be solved sequentially. The Stackelberg equilibrium will be
investigated.
IV. GAME EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In this section, we sequentially solve the sub-game perfect
equilibrium in each stage of Stackelberg game by employing
backward induction. Specifically, we analyze the content de-
mand of MUs in Stage III, the sponsoring strategy of the SCSP
as well as the caching strategy of the ECCSP in Stage II, and
the pricing strategy of the WNO in Stage I, respectively.
A. Stage III: MU’s content demand
Given the unit content downloading price p charged by the
WNO, sponsorship factor θ determined by the SCSP, as well
as caching effort t determined by the ECCSP, respectively,
the MUs determine optimal content demands for utility max-
imization individually in the sub-game Gu. Thus, we analyze
the sub-game Gu by solving the Problem 1. By substituting
f(·) as in (1) and g(·) as in (2) into (3), the utility of the MU
with the decision variable x is obtained as follows:
u(x; θ, t, p) =
τσe
1− αx
1−α +
τσet
1−β
(1− α)(1− β) (1− x)
1−α
− (1− x)c− (1− θ)xp. (16)
In the next step, the first order and second order derivatives
of (16) with respect to x is taken to prove its concavity, as
follows:
∂u
∂x
= τσex
−α − τσet
1−β
1− β (1− x)
−α + c− (1− θ)p, (17)
∂2u
∂x2
= −ατσex−α−1 − ατσet
1−β
1− β (1− x)
−α−1 < 0. (18)
As shown in (17), the second order derivative of u(·) is
always negative. Therefore, the function u is strictly concave
with respect to x. As the strategy space of x is already known
to be a convex and compact subset of the Euclidean space, the
following proposition can be concluded accordingly [9].
Proposition 1. The sub-game perfect equilibrium in the sub-
game Gu is unique.
Furthermore, based on the first order derivative condition,
we have
∂u
∂x
= τσex
−α− τσet
1−β
1− β (1− x)
−α+c−(1−θ)p = 0, (19)
and we can show that
x−α − t
1−β
1− β (1− x)
−α =
1
τσe
[
(1− θ) p− c
]
. (20)
The following conclusions hold. x∗ = 1 given the best
response of the MU is larger than 1; x∗ = 0 given the best
response of the MU is less than 0. If the best response of
the MU with respect to the content demand x∗ is within the
strategy space [0, 1], the best response of the MU, i.e., x∗,
satisfies the condition in (20), i.e.,
x∗−α − t
1−β
1− β (1− x
∗)−α =
1
τσe
[(1− θ) p− c] . (21)
∂x∗
∂θ
=
p
ατσe
[
x∗−α−1 + t1−β1−β (1− x∗)−α−1
] > 0. (12)
∂2x∗
∂θ2
=
[
−x∗−α−2 + t
1−β
1− β (1− x
∗)−α−2
] −(α+ 1)p2
α2τ2σe2
[
x∗−α−1 + t1−β1−β (1− x∗)−α−1
]3 . (13)
∂x∗
∂t
=
−t−β(1− x∗)−α
α
[
x∗−α−1 + t1−β1−β (1− x∗)−α−1
] < 0. (14)
∂2x∗
∂t2
=
t−β(1− x∗)−α
α
[
x∗−α−1 + t1−β1−β (1− x∗)−α−1
]{ 2t−β(1− x∗)−α−1
x∗−α−1 + t1−β1−β (1− x∗)−α−1
+
β
t
+
−(α+ 1)t−β(1− x∗)−α
[
−x∗−α−2 + t1−β1−β (1− x∗)−α−2
]
α
[
x∗−α−1 + t1−β1−β (1− x∗)−α−1
]2
}
. (15)
B. Stage II: SCSP’s sponsoring and ECCSP’s caching strategy
Given the sub-game equilibrium in Gu obtained from the
Stage III, the SCSP and ECCSP as 2nd-tier players optimize
the sponsoring and caching strategies for profit maximization
in a competitive manner, respectively. The optimal strategies
of both the SCSP and ECCSP are obtained by solving the
sub-game Problems 2-A and 2-B.
Firstly, we analyze the optimal sponsoring strategy of the
SCSP. Based on (5), the profit obtained by the SCSP can be
reformulated as follows:
Πs(θ; p) = σc
1
1− γ x
∗1−γ − θpx∗, (22)
where x∗ is the best response of the MU. The first and
second order derivatives of profit Πs(θ; p) with respect to the
sponsorship factor θ are given as follows:
∂Πs(θ; p)
∂θ
= σcx
∗−γ ∂x
∗
∂θ
− px∗ − θp∂x
∗
∂θ
, (23)
and
∂2Πs(θ; p)
∂θ2
= −γσcx∗−γ−1
(
∂x∗
∂θ
)2
+ σcx
∗−γ ∂
2x∗
∂θ2
− 2p∂x
∗
∂θ
− θp∂
2x∗
∂θ2
. (24)
From the condition in (20), we obtain ∂x
∗
∂θ and
∂2x∗
∂θ2 with
simple steps, as shown in (12) and (13).
Likewise, we analyze the optimal caching strategy of the
ECCSP. From (8), the profit obtained by the ECCSP can be
expressed as follows:
Πe(t; p) = σc
1
1− γ (1− x
∗)1−γ − Ct. (25)
The first and second derivatives of profit Πe(t; p) with respect
to caching effort t are given as follows:
∂Πe(t; p)
∂t
= σc(1− x∗)−γ ∂x
∗
∂t
− C, (26)
and
∂2Πe(t; p)
∂t2
= −γσc(1− x∗)−γ−1
(
∂x∗
∂t
)2
− σc(1− x∗)−γ ∂
2x∗
∂t2
. (27)
From the condition in (20), we derive ∂x
∗
∂t and
∂2x∗
∂t2 with
simple steps, as shown in (14) and (15). By analyzing the
profits of the SCSP and ECCSP given in (22) and (25),
respectively, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The existence of the Nash equilibrium in the
non-cooperative sub-game Gc is guaranteed if the following
conditions
σcx
∗−γ − θp > 0, (28)
− x∗−α−2 + t
1−β
1− β (1− x
∗)−α−2 > 0, (29)
and
γ + α− 1 > 0 (30)
hold.
Proof. From (13), we can easily know that ∂
2x∗
∂θ2 < 0 under the
condition in (29). Further, we have ∂x
∗
∂θ > 0 and
∂2Πs(θ;p)
∂θ2 =
−γσcx∗−γ−1
(
∂x∗
∂θ
)2
− (σcx∗−γ − θp)∂2x∗∂θ2 − 2p∂x
∗
∂θ . Con-
sequently, we can conclude that ∂
2Πs(θ;p)
∂θ2 < 0 under the
condition in (28). Then, we analyze the properties of ∂
2Πe(t;p)
∂t2 .
From (27), in order to prove that ∂
2Πe(t;p)
∂t2 is negative, we need
to prove that
γ(1− x∗)−1
(
∂x∗
∂t
)2
+
∂2x∗
∂t2
> 0. (31)
By substituting (14) and (15) into (31), and with simple steps,
we have
(γ + 2α) (1− x∗)−1x∗−α−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ (α+ 1)x∗−α−2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ (γ + α− 1) t
1−β
1− β (1− x
∗)−α−2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0. (32)
Accordingly, under the condition in (30), the inequality given
in (32) is satisfied. Therefore, the negativity of ∂
2Πe(t;p)
∂t2
is proven. Accordingly, the non-cooperative sub-game Gc
between the SCSP and ECCSP is a concave game, from which
the existence of the Nash equilibrium in the sub-game Gc
follows.
Finally, we prove the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in
the non-cooperative sub-game between the SCSP and ECCSP,
as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. If there exists at least one Nash equilibrium
in the non-cooperative sub-game Gc, the Nash equilibrium is
unique provided that the following condition
2α− 1 > 0 (33)
holds.
Proof Sketch. We mainly prove that the Jacobian matrix of
point-to-set mapping with respect to the profit profile of both
the SCSP and ECCSP is negative definite. Consequently, ∇F
is diagonally strictly concave, from which the uniqueness of
the Nash equilibrium in the non-cooperative sub-game Gc is
guaranteed [9]. Please refer to [10] for more details.
C. Stage I: WNO’s pricing strategy
In Stage I, the monopolist WNO determines the optimal
price p∗ by solving the Problem 3 with the optimal sponsor-
ship factor θ∗ as well as the optimal caching effort t∗ obtained
at Stage II, and the optimal content demand x∗ obtained at
Stage I. In this case, the Problem 3 can be reformulated as
follows:
maximize P(p) = px∗ − wx∗2 (34)
subject to 0 ≤ p ≤ p, (35)
θ∗ = arg max
θ
Πs, (36)
t∗ = arg max
t
Πe, (37)
σcx
∗−γ − θ∗p > 0, (38)
− x∗−α−2 + t
∗1−β
1− β (1− x
∗)−α−2 > 0, (39)
x∗−α − t
∗1−β
1− β (1− x
∗)−α =
1
τσe
[(1− θ∗) p− c] .
(40)
The constraint in (35) applies for the strategy space of the
WNO. The constraints in (36) and (37) indicate that θ∗ and
t∗ denote the best responses of the SCSP and ECCSP, respec-
tively, given the price p. The constraint in (38) is derived from
the best response of the MU given θ, t and p, which represents
the implicit function of x∗(θ, t, p). The constraints in (39)
and (40) ensure the existence and the uniqueness of the non-
cooperative sub-game Gc, which are given in Proposition 3.
Let X denote x∗(θ, t, p) : Dθ⊗Dt⊗Dp 7→ Dx, where ⊗
denotes the Cartesian product, Dθ, Dt and Dp represent the
domains of θ, t and p, respectively. Note that these domains
are all close sets. Further, we define Π(θ, t, p) and g(θ, t, p)
as follows: Π(θ, t, p) =
[
σch(X )− θpX
σch(1−X )− Ct
]
, g(θ, t, p) =[
−σcX−α + θp+ υ
X−α−2 − t1−β1−β (1−X )−α−2 + υ
]
, where υ is a small
number. In addition, we define ρ = [θ; t] : Dθ⊗Dt 7→ Dρ.
As a result, Problem 3 can be redefined as the bilevel
programming problem, which is shown as follows:
maximize
0<p<p
P(p) = pX − wX 2
subject to ρ∗ = arg max
ρ
Π(ρ, p),
g(ρ, p) ≤ 0,
ρ ∈ Dρ.
(41)
As shown in Section IV-B, we have proved the existence of a
unique pair of θ∗ and t∗ for any given p as the optimal solution
of Problem 2, i.e., the Nash equilibrium in non-cooperative
sub-game Gc. Accordingly, the optimal solution to the lower-
level programming problem ρ∗ = [θ∗; t∗] exists and is unique,
for any given p. Therefore, the strong sufficient optimality
condition of second order (SSOSC) is satisfied for the bilevel
programming problem in (41) because of the existence and the
uniqueness of ρ∗ (Theorem 3.9 in [11]). This indicates that the
optimal solution to the lower-level programming problem of
the bilevel programming problem is strongly stable. Thus, our
bilevel programming problem can be reduced to a single-level
problem, which is expressed as follows:
maximize
0<p<p
P(p) = pX − wX 2,
subject to ρ = U(p).
(42)
ρ = U(p) in the constraint can be obtained by using the
KKT condition to the lower-level programming problem of
the bilevel programming problem as follows:{ ∇ρΠ(ρ, p)− λ>∇ρg(ρ, p) = 0,
0 ≤ λ⊥− g(ρ, p) ≥ 0, (43)
where λ denotes the Lagrangian multiplier vector. Moreover,
the feasible domain of the single-level programming is defined
as Ω(p,ρ) = { (p,ρ)|ρ = U(p), p ∈ Dp}, which is a non-
empty and closed set according to the Weierstrass Theo-
rem [12]. Since we know that the optimal solution to the
lower-level programming problem of the bilevel programming
problem is unique, Constant Rank Constraint Qualification
(CRCQ) and Mangasarian-Fromovitz Constraint Qualification
(MFCQ) are satisfied by all the feasible points in Ω(p,ρ)
(Theorem 3.9 in [11]). Based on Theorem 4.10 in [13], ρ =
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Figure 1: The impact of the price constraint p on the WNO from
joint sponsored and edge caching content service market.
U(p) is a piecewise continuously differentiable function and
(p,ρ) = (p, U(p)) is therefore continuous on p. Further, with
the closed sets Ω(p,ρ) and Dp, according to the well-known
Closed Graph Theorem, we can conclude that ρ = U(p)
being continuous implies that the mapping Dp 7→ Ω(p,ρ) is
closed. Therefore, Ω(p,ρ) is non-empty and closed, and thus
the bilevel programming problem admits a globally optimal
solution, i.e., the Stackelberg equilibrium. Accordingly, we
conclude with the following proposition.
Proposition 4. There exists at least one Stackelberg equilib-
rium in the proposed three-stage Stackelberg game.
Each stage of the proposed three-stage Stackelberg game has
been investigated so far. Similar to that in [14], we then present
the sub-gradient based algorithm to obtain the Stackelberg
equilibrium of the proposed game. The convergence property
of the sub-gradient based iterative algorithm has been proved
in [14].
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We employ simulations to evaluate the network participant
performance metrics in the proposed joint sponsored and
edge caching content service market, with default network
parameters set as follows: α = 0.8, β = 0.5, γ = 0.8, la = 1,
σe = 40, σc = 120, c = 80, C = 120, w = 1 and p = 100.
Firstly, the impact of the price constraint on the WNO is
investigated, as in Fig. 1. It is worth noting that the optimal
price offered by the WNO is the same as the maximum
price constraint. The intuition is that the lower price can
attract the MU to consume more sponsored content from the
SCSP, which may incur higher delivery cost maintained by
the WNO. Thus, the WNO is reluctant to lower the offered
price. In addition, we find that as the price constraint, i.e.,
the optimal price increases, the payoff of the WNO increases
and the sponsored content demand of the MU decreases.
This is because the WNO is able to set a higher price and
extract more surplus from the MU, and achieves higher payoff
consequently. Further, as expected, the payoff of the WNO
decreases with the increase of w, i.e., the unit cost of content
delivery.
We next study the impact of the utility coefficient of MUs
on the players in the game model, as illustrated in Fig. 2. We
find that the sponsored content demand of the MU decreases
with the increase of σe. This is because when σe increases, the
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Figure 2: The impact of the utility level of MUs on the players
(MUs, SCSP, ECCSP, and WNO) from joint sponsored and edge
caching content service market.
sponsorship fee from the SCSP becomes relative lower com-
pared with the improved utility of the MU from consuming
the content. Recall that the caching effort positively affects
the utility of the MU from consuming the content, therefore,
the sponsored content demand of the MU decreases. As a
result, the SCSP wants to offer more sponsorship fee to attract
the MU to consume the sponsored content, and the ECCSP
has an incentive to lower its caching effort to reduce the
caching cost. Once the sponsorship fee from the SCSP is large
enough, the SCSP is not willing to offer more sponsorship
fee to save its cost. Accordingly, the sponsorship fee from the
SCSP increases first and then decreases. Therefore, the SCSP’s
profit decreases and the ECCSP’s profit increases, which is
consistent with the results in Fig. 2. Since the sponsored
content demand of the MU decreases, and thus the payment
from the MU to the WNO is reduced, which leads to the
decrease of the WNO’s payoff. As expected, we find that
the sponsored content demand of the MU increases and the
caching effort of the ECCSP decreases as the content caching
cost C increases. This is due to the fact that, with the increase
of C, the cost of the ECCSP for increasing caching effort
becomes greater. In this case, the ECCSP is willing to reduce
its caching effort for saving cost and thus compensate for its
decreasing profit. Meanwhile, the SCSP wants to offer higher
sponsorship fee to the MU for encouraging the MU’s higher
sponsored content demand. Consequently, both the SCSP’s
profit and the WNO’s payoff increase. Moreover, from Fig. 2,
we find that the increase of the advertisement length la leads
to the increase of the SCSP’s profit and the WNO’s payoff.
This is because when la increases, the utility of the MU from
consuming the content decreases, and the offered sponsorship
fee becomes significant for the MU. This encourages higher
sponsored content demand of the MU, which benefits the
SCSP and the WNO accordingly. Therefore, the profit of the
ECCSP decreases because of its decreasing content traffic.
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Figure 3: The impact of the advertisement revenue coefficient on
the players (MUs, SCSP, ECCSP, and WNO) from joint sponsored
and edge caching content service market.
Lastly, we examine the impact of the advertisement revenue
coefficient σc on the players in the game model, as illustrated
in Fig. 3. We find that the profit of the SCSP, the profit of the
ECCSP, and payoff of the WNO increases with the increase of
σc. This is because the advertisement revenue from increasing
content traffic is improved as σc increases. Thus, the profit
of both the SCSP and ECCSP are improved. In this case, the
SCSP and ECCSP are more willing to increase the sponsorship
fee and caching effort, respectively, to attract more demand
from the MU. Recall that the optimal price is equal to the
price constraint. As the price is fixed, with the increase of σc,
the SCSP has an incentive to offer a higher sponsorship fee to
the MU since its cost becomes insignificant compared with
the increasing advertisement revenue coefficient. Thus, the
sponsored content demand of the MU increases, which leads to
the increase of the WNO’s payoff consequently. By comparing
curves with different value of handover cost c, we find that the
decrease of c leads to the decrease of the sponsored content
demand, the SCSP’s profit and the WNO’s payoff. This is
due to the fact that the MU is reluctant to choose the cached
content from the ECCSP when the handover cost is high.
Consequently, the MU is more willing to access and consume
the content from the SCSP using. Due to the increasing
content traffic, the WNO’s payoff is improved accordingly.
Utilizing this fact, the SCSP also has an incentive to reduce its
sponsorship fee for saving the cost and achieving higher profit.
However, the ECCSP needs to increase its caching effort to
compensate for the higher handover cost. Therefore, the profit
of the ECCSP decreases as shown in Fig. 3.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have considered a three-stage Stackelberg
game based market model for a joint sponsored and edge
caching content service. The model describes the interactions
among the wireless operator, the sponsored content provider,
and the edge provider. The analytical form of the sub-
game perfect equilibrium in each stage has been analyzed
by backward induction. We have also validated the existence
of the Stackelberg equilibrium by capitalizing on the bilevel
optimization technique. Furthermore, a sub-gradient based
iterative algorithm has been proposed, which converges to
the Stackelberg equilibrium with certainty. Numerical results
have been proposed to evaluate the performance of all the
game participants. Further studies of this work will focus
on the social interactions among the users such as [15], or
the dynamic pricing scheme such as [16] in the context of
sponsored content.
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